Aumann for many hours of conversation and a prominent involvement in the writing process and in conceptual issues related to this paper. Please see also the last paragraph of Section 1.3.
Introduction
In extensive games of perfect information (PI), backward induction (BI) is a particularly prominent solution concept. The guiding principle behind BI is repeated application of the principle that when a player must choose between several options, he chooses the option that yields him the highest payoff. Call a PI game generic if the payoffs of each player are different at different terminal nodes. In a seminal paper, Aumann (1995) gave the following epistemic characterization of BI in PI games: Theorem 1.1. In a generic PI game, common knowledge 1 of rationality (CKR) is consistent and entails the BI outcome.
Here, "rationality" is defined as follows: Given a node h of the game, a player is h-rational if it is not the case that he knows that in the subgame starting at h, he can get a higher payoff by changing his strategy. 2 He is rational if he is h-rational at each of his nodes h.
Aumann's work has been criticized because his definition of rationality appears too strong; specifically, because it calls for h-rationality even when h has been excluded at a previous node by the very same player who must play at h. To illustrate the difficulty, consider first the game in Figure 1 , and suppose that Ann's strategy and Bob's strategy call for them to exit 1 An assertion is commonly known if all players know it, all know that all know it, all know that, and so on ad infinitum. 2 A strategy of a player i is a function that assigns an alternative of i at v to each node v of i. (play "down") at each of their moves, and both know this. By Aumann's definition, Ann is not rational, because at her second node, she chooses to get 0, whereas she could get 3 by playing "across." But one might argue that it
does not matter what she does at her second node, since she herself excluded the possibility of reaching that node by exiting at her first node; and, that was rational. So perhaps one should use a weaker (i.e., less demanding) definition of rationality, namely, to call a player "rational" if he is h-rational at all h that he himself has not excluded at a previous node. Henceforth, we call such a node unexcluded.
But as a conceptual rebuttal, this example is not fully convincing. Here we still get the BI outcome, even though only the weakened form of rationality obtains. Aumann could say, "OK, perhaps my definition is too strong, perhaps a weaker-and more appropriate-definition of rationality is sufficient to yield my result; but my result, though perhaps not the strongest possible, still points in the right direction-that CK of rationality, however defined, leads to the BI outcome." For a more convincing rebuttal of Aumann, one needs an example in which CK of the weakened version of rationality obtains, and the BI outcome is not reached.
Such an example was indeed suggested by Robert Stalnaker [10] ; see Fig-ure 2. Again, suppose that both Ann's strategy and Bob's call for them to exit at each of their moves, and both know that. With rationality in Aumann's sense, CKR does not obtain-Ann behaves irrationally at her second node-and his theorem does not require the BI outcome to be reached; and indeed it is not. But CK of the weakened-and apparently more appropriateversion of rationality does obtain, and nevertheless the BI outcome is not reached.
To make sense of this, Stalnaker tells the following story: At her first node, Ann must choose between "down" and "across." If she chooses "down," she gets 2. If she chooses "across," then it is Bob's turn; since he exits, she will get 1, which is < 2. So it is indeed rational for her to exit. Moreover, if she plays "across," then Bob will conclude that she is irrational, and so will fear that she would play irrationally also at her second node; and indeed, that is what her strategy prescribes. So it appears that CK of rationality-in a fairly natural sense of the word-does obtain here.
But one may ask, if Ann would play "across," would Bob really necessarily conclude that she is irrational? Might he not conclude that she is not playing as he thought she would (to exit)-as indeed is clearly the case-and does not expect him to exit either? Perhaps she expects him to play "across," and then she would play across as well! In that case he would be well-advised indeed to play across.
It is difficult to answer this question with the above kind of verbal, imprecise reasoning. would have happened had she stayed in (played "across").
That's where belief-by which we mean attributing probability 1-comes in. If Bob knows that Ann will go out at her first move, then it is difficult to make sense of what he "would" have done had she stayed in. But if he only believed that she would exit-did not entirely exclude the possibility that she would stay in-then it makes sense to talk about what he "would" have done had she stayed in; it is simply what he will do, if 3 she stays in. Replacing "knowledge" by "belief" enables us to replace the troublesome "would" by "will."
So, let's review Stalnaker's example, substituting "belief" for "knowledge." Suppose that at the beginning of play:
(1) Ann believes that Bob will exit if she stays in; (2.1) Bob believes that Ann will exit; (2.2) Bob believes that if both Ann and he stay in, Ann will exit at her second node; and With this scenario, at the beginning of play there is indeed common belief 3 This "if," like all subsequent "if"s in this discussion, signifies the ordinary material implication of mathematics; i.e., "if p, then q" means "q or not p," no more and no less. 4 That is, both believe them, both believe that both believe them, both believe that, and so on ad infinitum.
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that both players will play rationally at all unexcluded nodes. 5 So on the face of it, it would appear that Aumann's theorem is indeed an artifact of an excessively strong definition of rationality.
But on closer scrutiny, the explicit setting forth of the above scenario reveals its difficulties. Does (2.2) make sense? By (2.1), the fact that Bob's node was reached means that Ann did something highly unexpected. To be sure, Bob could reach the conclusion that Ann is irrational. But why should he? If she already did something unexpected-something that requires him to revise his beliefs-why would he not reach the conclusion that if he plays across, then she, too, will play across at her second node? To be sure, he
does not have to think this, but why shouldn't he?
Well, the reader may ask, why should he? Can we formulate some rationality postulate that would enable us to reach that conclusion?
The answer is yes. The key concept is that of "strong belief." Let's say that a player strongly believes an assertion, if he believes it unless it is logically impossible. Then Stalnaker's "story"-i.e., the above scenariois inconsistent with common strong belief of rationality at unexcluded nodes (CSBRU). Indeed, (2.2) is inconsistent with CSBRU, as we now show.
Assume Bob strongly believes Ann is rational and also believes that Ann will exit at the beginning of the game. Suppose that Ann stayed and it is now Bob's turn to play; can Bob revise his beliefs in a way that still supports Ann's rationality? The answer is yes; if Ann is rational and stayed in, it must be because she believes that Bob will stay in, and then on her last move Ann will stay in, and get 3 instead of 2. So if Bob strongly believes that Ann is rational, he should deduce that if Ann stayed in on her first move, she will also stay in on her last move.
5 See Stalnaker's "story," set forth in the previous section.
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Now assume that Ann believes that Bob strongly believes that she is rational; then by the above reasoning, she must believe that if she were to stay in, Bob would also stay in. So if Bob is rational and strongly believes that Ann is rational, he will stay in, if he gets a chance to play. And if Ann is rational and believes that Bob strongly believes that she is rational, then she will stay in on her first and last node. So in Stalnaker's game, CSBRU entails the BI outcome.
Thus in Stalnaker's game, all three nodes can be reached without contradicting the assumption of rationality. But there are games where some nodes cannot be reached with rational players. Thus in the game of Figure   1 , Bob's node cannot be reached if Ann is rational. Nevertheless, CSBRU is possible in this game. Indeed, Bob's node is always unexcluded, since he has no previous nodes; if it is reached, then it is logically impossible for Ann to be rational, so under the definition, he still "strongly believes" that she is rational. Thus here, too, as in Stalnaker's game, CSBRU is consistent, and entails the BI outcome.
It is the purpose of this paper to prove that that holds in general; i.e., we have the following:
Main Theorem: In a generic PI game, CSBRU is consistent and entails the BI outcome.
Syntax and Semantics
The theorem just formulated belongs to an area of mathematical game theory called interactive epistemology. There are two parallel kinds of formalism for formulating and proving results in this area: the semantic and the syntactic. Syntactic formalisms are different; they work directly with sentences, rather than with states. There is a formal language, and there are axioms, rules of deduction, tautologies, 7 and formal proofs, using the axioms and rules.
In many contexts, a sentence is a tautology in a semantic formalism-"holds" at each state in an arbitrary universe-if and only if it is provable in the corresponding syntactic formalism-follows logically from the axioms and rules of deduction. Specifically, that is so in the context of knowledge (e.g., Aumann [3] ).
Each kind of formalism has advantages. The main advantages of semantic formalisms are practical: they are easier to visualize, and also easier to work with. The main advantage of a syntactic formalism is conceptual: it is more straightforward and transparent-basically it says in plain words what it is that one wants to prove, and then proves it, logically, from explicit assumptions. By contrast, semantic formalisms are devious: to prove something, 6 We use the indefinite article because in different contexts-like knowledge, probability, and belief-the formalisms are somewhat different. Moreover, the actual realization of the formalisms depends on parameters such as the number of players. 7 Tautologies are sometimes called theorems 9 one must first restate it in set-theoretic language, and then establish it in an arbitrary universe. As Professor Dov Samet has put it, 8 if you want to explain it to your mother, say it syntactically; there's no way that she'll understand the semantic formulation.
There is, however, one important respect in which semantic formalisms are formally superior-one kind of task they can perform, that the syntactic formalisms cannot. Namely, they can prove consistency. In syntactic formalisms, one cannot show that a sentence is consistent-that its negation is not a tautology from the axioms. For that, one needs a model of the sentence-a state in a semantic universe at which the sentence in question "holds." Indeed, throughout mathematics, all consistency proofs use models, starting with the Bolyai-Lobachevsky proof that Euclid's parallel postulate does not follow from his axioms-i.e., that its negation is consistent with the axioms.
In particular, whereas the second part of our main theorem-that CSBRU entails the BI outcome-may be proved syntactically, its first part-that it is consistent-requires a semantic proof. Note, however, that whereas the proof is semantic, the formulation is purely syntactic. Indeed, the consistency of an assertion is intrinsically a syntactic notion: it means that the negation of the assertion does not follow from the axioms.
In practice, our proof of the main theorem combines syntactic and semantic methods throughout.
In addition to its transparency, the syntactic formalism has two important advantages in our context, both having to do with the fundamental notion of "strong belief." The first has to do with "belief," the second with that of "strong." What we here want to convey by saying that a player "believes" something is that he ascribes to it probability 1. The advantage of the syntactic formalism is that to deal with this formally, one does not need the whole gamut of numerical probabilities; rather, one axiomatizes the notion of belief-probability 1-directly, and then works only with those axioms, without reference to other probabilities. By contrast, semantic formalisms for belief that have heretofore been used in game-theoretic contexts allow all numbers between 0 and 1 as probabilities, and so are needlessly complex. In this paper we do develop a semantic formalism for belief and belief revision, which does not use numerical probabilities.
The second-and perhaps more fundamental-advantage of the syntactic formalism has to do with the adjective "strong," which calls for the notion of "provability" to play an important formal role within the statement of the result. Of course this paper, like all others in mathematics, is about theorems; all tautologies are provable-what we do in mathematics is prove theorems. But usually, the notion of "tautology" is not part of the statement of the result; the result is stated without involving the notion of provability, and then one simply asserts and proves the statement.
Here the situation is different. Assertions that some specific statements are or are not tautologies become elements in more complex assertions, and these, in turn, become elements in still more complex assertions, and so on. Specifically, CSBRU-common strong belief of rationality at unexcluded nodes-involves the notion of strong belief; and strong belief of a statement means that the statement is believed unless it is logically impossible-i.e., unless its negation is tautology. When we talk about common strong belief, we are iterating this kind of statement, indeed unboundedly often. Thus, in addition to the usual logical operators and connectives like " not," "or", and "and," we use an additional operator, t, which says that the formula following it is tautology; and whereas this operator is familiar in the metalanguage of logic, it is unusual that it becomes part of the formal language itself, from which new assertions can be formed.
Provability can be treated also within the semantic formalism, but it is considerably more awkward to do so, as we will see presently.
Battigalli and Sinischalchi
A seminal result that is conceptually closely related to our Main Theorem was established by Battigalli and Sinischalchi [7] (henceforth BS). But, whereas the conceptual content of the BS result is similar to that of ours, its formal statement is devious and round-about. In contrast, our Main Theorem formulates its conceptual content in a transparent and straightforward manner.
The BS result is formulated semantically. To state it and understand its relationship with ours, we start by describing the relationship between semantic and syntactic formalisms more carefully. Each sentence in a syntactic formalism corresponds to a set in each semantic universe-intuitively, the set of states in that universe at which that sentence "holds." Moreover, each logical operator corresponds to a set operation: "and" to intersection, "or" to union, and "not" to complementation (w.r.t. that particular universe); and a sentence that is provable in the syntax corresponds to the entire universe, since it must hold at each state. Conversely, if a sentence in the syntax corresponds in each arbitrary universe to the entire universe, then it is a tautology.
All that is well and good as long as the provability operator, t, is not an element of the syntactic language itself, but only of the metalanguage. As soon as t becomes part of the language itself, the elegant one-one correspondence between syntax and semantics breaks down. Indeed, the operator t does not correspond to any set operation within a particular universe, since it refers simultaneously to all universes. For a sentence to be a tautology means that in any universe, the sentence corresponds to the entire universe;
and there is no way of saying that within a particular universe.
BS work with semantics, so that is a real obstacle for them. To describe how they circumvent it, we must ourselves make a detour, via the epistemology of knowledge. In that context, there exists a single universe, called the canonical universe, such that a given sentence is provable in the syntax if and only if the corresponding set in the canonical universe is the entire canonical universe (see, e.g., Aumann [3] ). Thus, once we have a canonical universe, we need no longer to refer to arbitrary universes to formulate the syntaxsemantics equivalence; it is enough refer to one specific universe, namely the canonical one. Constructing the canonical universe is not a simple matter;
and once constructed, it is not a simple matter to establish the basic property just enunciated. But such an object does exist.
Moreover, the canonical universe enables a valid semantic representation of syntactic sentences involving the provability operator t. Namely, the tautology operator corresponds to a set operator that takes the whole canonical universe to itself, and all its proper subsets to the empty set.
BS started by constructing a probabilistic analogue of the canonical semantic knowledge universe, which they called the universal type space. This construction is already very complex and deep, using a full-blown probabilistic semantic formalism, with sigma-fields of events on which numerical probabilities ranging between 0 and 1 are defined; and this in spite of the fact that they, like us, are interested only in belief-i.e., probability 1. It was published by them separately in 1999, three years before the paper with the main result [6] . Then, in 2002, they showed that the subset of the univer-13 sal type space that corresponds to CSBRU is nonempty and entails the BI outcome (see [7] ).
This may be considered a semantic analogue of our main theorem. To use it actually to derive our main theorem-which is syntactic-one would need to establish a syntax-semantics equivalence similar to that to which we alluded above in the context of knowledge. But BS did not prove, or even formulate, such an equivalence. Thus the conceptual interpretation of their result is like that of ours; but both its formulation and proof are far more intricate and difficult.
Nevertheless, there is no question that their contribution is of fundamental importance.
The notion of strong belief presented here, as well as it syntactic representation, were developed by R.J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger in the nineties of the previous century; they also conjectured the result established here, independently of Battigalli and Sinischalchi. However, they did not succeed in proving it fully; specifically, they were unable to establish the consistency of CSBRU, and so did not publish thier research on this topic.
Framework 2.1 Language
Start with a generic 9 PI game G. A node (a.k.a. vertex, or history, ) of Player i is one at which i is active. A strategy of i is a function that assigns an action of i at h to each of i's nodes h. Each strategy s i of i determines a set H(s i ) of nodes of i, namely, those that s i allows (does not preclude by 9 This means that for each player, the payoffs at different terminal nodes are different.
14 an action at a previous node). A plan of i is the restriction 10 of a strategy
In the sequel, we wish to refer to the beliefs of a player at each of his nodes, and also to his prior beliefs, before he observes anything. It is therefore convenient to add to the formalism the belief of each player at the root of the game tree (or at the empty history). Let H i be the set consisting of the root and the nodes at which Player i is active.
We now construct a formal language. The building blocks are the following:
1. Atomic sentences. These have the form "player i uses plan p i ," denoted simply p i .
Left parentheses and right parentheses.
3. Connectives and operators of the propositional calculus. As is known, it is sufficient to take just "or" (∨) and "not" (¬) as primitives, and in terms of them to define "and" (∧) and "implies" (→).
4. Belief modalities. For each player i and node h ∈ H i , there is a belief modality, b h i . Informally, if g is a formula (see below), then b h i (g) means that conditional on the players other than i choosing plans that allow h, player i ascribes probability 1 to g at the beginning of play.
11 Verbally, we will describe b h i (g) by saying that " i believes g at h;" but that is only a manner of speaking-the more accurate meaning is the above. 10 Plans are sometimes called "strategies."Here we do not want a strategy to be defined at the nodes that it excludes.
11 Players are not permitted to condition on their own actions; that would bring us uncomfortably close to counterfactual reasoning.
Definition 2.1. A formula is a finite string obtained by applying the following two rules, in some order, finitely often:
• Every atomic sentence is a formula.
• If f and g are formulas, so are (f ) ∨ (g)
tree (or that h is a prefix of h). If a is an action at node h ∈ H i , the formula that expresses "i plays a" (or simply a for short) has the form ∨p i , where the disjunction ranges over all plans of i that call for him to play a at h. Also, "h is reached" (or simply h) is the formula ∧d, where the conjunction ranges over all actions d on the path to h of all players with histories on that path.
If L is a set of nodes, then "L is reached" (or simply L) is the formula ∨h, where the disjunction ranges over all h in L.
For any node h and player i, an h-plan of i is a plan of i that allows h; denote by P i (h) the set of all i's h-plans. An opposition h-plan is a conjunction of plans that allow h, one for each player other than i. An h-plan p i together with an opposition h-plan p −i determine a terminal node z of the game tree where z h. and a payoff u i (p i , p −i ) for i. The set of all opposition h-plans is denoted P −i (h), and the formula that expresses "all players other than i allow h" is:
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Logic
We now present the axioms and inference rules that govern the internal logic of our language. The axioms are as follows:
(1) The axioms of the propositional calculus.
For every player i:
The system defined by these axioms and rules will be called AX.
The inference rules are as follows: (4.1) From f → g and f infer g (modus ponens).
Axioms (2.1) and (2.2) express the requirement that every player execute exactly one plan. Axiom schemas (3.1) and (3.2) represent classical modal belief axioms (see, e.g., [8] ). Axiom schemas (3.3) through (3.5) combine versions of the "truth" and "introspection" axioms. Briefly, they say that players are sure of their own plans and beliefs. Axiom (3.6) says that at h, player i believes that the other players played to allow h. Axiom (3.7), concerns belief revision; it says that if at h, i believed f and also that the subsequent nodeĥ "could" occur, then he believes f atĥ. This reflects the idea that players update their beliefs in a Bayesian way.
A set of formulas L is called a list.
It is called epistemically closed if it is closed under generalization: 12 f is inconsistent if its negation is tautology; otherwise it is consistent.
It entails g if the formula f → g is tautology. The formulas f 1 , f 2 , . . . are inconsistent if the conjunction of some finite subset of them is inconsistent; otherwise they are consistent. They entail g if the conjunction of some finite subset of them entails g. Denote by T the set of all tautologies of AX. Call each formula f ∈ T a simple tautology.
Tautology Calculus
To state the Main Theorem as a formula within our language, we need to incorporate the notion of provability as a formal element of the language.
So, we augment the language by adding a provability modality, denoted t;
informally, if g is a formula, then t(g) means that g is a tautology. To the rules that define the formation of formulas (see [8] ), we add the following:
• If f is a formula, so is t(f ).
We denote the augmented syntax by χ . The definition of closure (2.2 above) extends verbatim to the augmented syntax
Loosely speaking, we would like to extend the concept of "tautology" to the augmented syntax in such a way so that t(f ) is a tautology whenever f is a tautology and ¬t(f ) is a tautology whenever f is not a tautology. Therefore, for every formula f in χ , either t(f ) is a tautology or ¬t(f ) is a tautology.
Thus, one may expect that the list of tautologies in the augmented language will include all the formulas of the form t(f ) where f is a basic tautology and all the formulas ¬t(f ) where f is a basic formula that is not a basic tautology. By the following Lemma, there exists a unique such list which is strongly closed and satisfies this requirement.
Lemma 2.1. There exists a unique list T ⊆ χ with T ∩ χ = T that is closed and tautologically complete.
the proof of the Lemma is relegated to an Appendix.
A formula f ∈ χ is a tautology in the augmented axiomatization if it is in T . Write AX f for f ∈ T . 
Semantics
The notion of strong belief that plays a central role in our theorem depends crucially on that of consistency-that a formula does not contradict the axioms, that its negation cannot be proved. Proving consistency syntactically is a tricky matter; to prove a formula, one writes down a proof, but how does one show that something cannot be proved? On the face of it, it would seem that one would have to write all possible proofs, and show that none of them end with the given formula.
To cope with this difficulty we present a friendly semantic formalism that represents a way to interpret the formal language. This will enable us to determine whether a given formula is consistent. We start by defining models for our language. To each formula f in the syntax, assign a subset f of Ω, representing the set of states at which f holds (or is "true"); formally, f is defined inductively over the "depth" of a formula as follows:
In these terms, Requirement 6 may be restated as 6'.
An element of the set f will be called a model of the formula f. 3 The Theorem
Rationality
Call a player rational if at every node allowed by his plan, he does not believe that he has a plan that yields him a higher payoff. 14 Formally, if p i and q i are different plans of player i, set Q
is the disjunction of opposition h-plans in P −i (h) for which q i yields more than p i to i (if there are no such p −i , let
(q i ) be a contradiction). The formula that asserts that plan p i is rational for i is then
Define player i to be rational if he uses a rational plan, that is,
Remark. We do not claim that the above definition of "rationality" is the only reasonable one. We do however claim that if i is "rational" in any commonly accepted sense (such as utility maximization), then certainly r i obtains.
The formula corresponding to all players being rational is r := i r i .
Strong Belief
Say that i strongly believes a formula g (written sb i (g)) if for each node h of i, either
(ii) g precludes h being reached (or equivalently, g is inconsistent with h).
In words, i continues to believe g no matter what happens, unless he reaches a node that is logically impossible under g. In symbols:
.
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Say that g is strongly believed (or that there is strong belief of g, written sb(g)) if each player strongly believes g. Mutual strong belief of g of order n (written sb n (g)) is defined inductively as sb n−1 (g) ∧ sb(sb n−1 (g)); that is, each iteration provides for the foregoing iteration and strong belief thereof (note that the strong belief operator does not commute with conjunction).
Common strong belief of g comprises all the formulas sb n (g) for all n.
The main result of this paper states the following:
Theorem. Common strong belief of rationality is consistent and entails the unique backward induction outcome for every generic PI game.
Outline of the Proof of the Main Theorem
The proof has two parts. The first describes an elimination process culminating with the BI outcome. The second identifies the result of the (k + 1)'th step of that process with (sb) k (r), i.e., k'th order strong belief of rationality.
Before each step of the elimination process, there is a set of current plans of each player; a node is relevant at that step if it is allowed by some profile of current plans. Before the first step, all plans are current. To go from one step to the next, retain only those plans p i of player i that, at each relevant node h allowed by p i , are not strictly dominated by an h-plan of i w.r.t. current opposition h-profiles. 15 The process clearly "ends" after finitely many steps, in the sense that the set of current plans does not change thereafter. We will show that there are plan profiles that survive the process, and all of them lead to the BI outcome (see Lemma 5.1).
This describes the first part of the proof. The second part demonstrates that a plan survives the (k + 1)'th step of the process if and only if it is consistent with k'th order strong belief of rationality (see Lemma 5.2).
The proof of the second part is by induction. Suppose the lemma true up to and including k. To demonstrate "if," we show that if a plan p i does not survive the (k + 1)'th step, then it is inconsistent with k'th order strong belief of rationality. Indeed, in that case there is a relevant node h allowed by p i such that p i is not a best reply to any opposition h-profile of current plans. But then p i cannot be rational under any possible beliefs of i at h that are consistent with k'th order strong belief of rationality.
To demonstrate "only if," we must show that any plan surviving the (k + 1)'th step of the process is consistent with k'th order strong belief of rationality. Consistency is demonstrated semantically, that is, by building a model in which it holds.
Proof of the Main Theorem
Before proving our Main Theorem it is helpful to link between consistency in the language χ with respect to AX and consistency in χ with respect to AX. The following result is essentially a restatement of the definition of strong belief and of a tautology in χ .
Proposition 1.
A formula f ∈ χ is consistent (or a tautology) with respect to AX iff it is consistent (or a tautology) with respect to AX . Moreover,
where
Proposition 1 provides a straightforward inductive way to convert any formula of the form sb n (r) to a logically equivalent formula in χ, i.e., a formula not involving the modality t.
In the proof of the theorem we use a finite family of models that will be helpful in proving consistency for the formulas sb n (r). This family is a sub-family of the models introduced in Definition 2.4.
Definition 5.1. A model for the syntax χ is called simple if:
1. The set of states of the world is Ω = i∈I P i , where P i is the set of plans for player i.
2. p : Ω → P is the identity map.
3. The atoms K of K i are determined by p i ; i.e., two states belong to the same atom of K i iff they specify the same plan for i.
In a simple model, if I is the atom of Player i at whose states he plays p i , and h is a node of i, we will sometimes write B h (p i ) instead of B h i (I).
Consider the following inductively defined sequence of plans:
For every player i, define
For n ≥ 0, assume P n i to be defined for every player i, and let H n be those non-terminal nodes that are allowed (reachable) by profiles of plans from
as the set of all plans p i satisfying the following requirements:
2. For every node h ∈ H(p i ) ∩ H n and for every q i ∈ P i (h), p i is not strictly dominated by q i with respect to P n −i in the subgame starting at h; i.e., there exists a
In the terminology of the above "outline," P n i comprises i's "current" plans. to be those plans in W n i that are not (weakly) dominated by any plan from P i with respect to W n −i .
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We prove that W n = P n for every n ≥ 0. For n = 0 it trivially holds. Now assume W n = P n and let
. So p i is weakly dominated by some q i with respect to W n −i (= P n −i ). So, there exists h ∈ H n that are allowed by both p i and q i for which p i prescribe an action a, and q i prescribe a different action, b. But since the game is generic, h ∈ H n , and p i is weakly dominated by q i , one can deduce that q i strongly dominates p i in the subgame starting at h with respect to P n −i (h). And so, p i ∈ P n+1 i ; therefore,
For the other direction, let p i ∈ P n+1 i \ P n i by definition there exists a node h ∈ H n that is allowed by p i and a plan q i ∈ P i (h) such that q i strongly dominates p i at h. Define a plan for player i, l i as follows:
The node h is allowed by P n ; therefore by the induction hypothesis it is allowed also by W n and so l i (h) weakly dominates p i with
16 Alternatively, one can retain those plans that are not dominated by any plan from , then p i is inconsistent with sb n (r) (where sb 0 (r) := r).
"If": There exists a simple model M n such that whenever 0 ≤ k ≤ n, every profile of plans in P k+1 , when viewed as a point in Ω, is a model for
n=0 .
Only if: Suppose that p i ∈ P 1 i ; we will show that p i is not consistent with r. Since p i ∈ P 1 i , there is a node h ∈ H(p i ), and a plan q i ∈ P i (h) such that for every opposition h-plan p −i , we have u i (p i , p −i ) < u i (q i , p −i ). That is, q i is better for i than p i , no matter what the opposition does; so p i cannot be rational, no matter what i believes. Formally, by definition of rationality
, which contradicts axiom (3.6).
If: We construct a simple model M 0 , and show that r holds at every point in P 1 (which is nonempty by Lemma 5.1). So it will follow that sb 0 (r) = r is consistent.
For every player i, plan p i ∈ P 1 i and node h ∈ H i , define B h (p i ) as the set of all plan profiles that are consistent with h and p i ; i.e.,
Let p ∈ P 1 ; by definition of P 1 i we deduce that for every h ∈ H(p i ) and for every q i ∈ P i (h), there exists
i.e., for every i, every node h allowed by p i , and every q i ∈ P i (h) other than p i , player i does not believe that q i strictly dominates p i . Therefore,
when p is viewed as a point in Ω. So p ∈ ||r(p i )|| for all i, or alternatively, ||p ∧ r(p i )|| = ∅, where p is now viewed as a formula. But AX r ∧ p ↔ ∧ i∈I r(p i ). Thus p is indeed consistent with r.
At this point we have the basis for the induction. Now assume the induction hypothesis for n − 1; we prove it for n as follows:
Only if: Let p i be a plan of player i that is not in P n+1 i
. If p i ∈ P n i , then by the induction hypothesis we are done. So we may take p i ∈ P n i P n+1 i
. Then for some node h ∈ H(p i ) ∩ H n there exists a strategy q i ∈ P i (h) such that
. By the induction hypothesis, the plans of players other than i that are consistent with sb n−1 (r)
are precisely those in P
Again by the induction hypothesis, h is consistent with sb n−1 (r), so by the definition of
Therefore by axioms (3.1) and (4.2), AX sb 
. If: By the induction hypothesis, in the model M n−1 , we have that for all k < n,
For each player i and plan p i , define the model M n as follows:
We show that if p ∈ P k+1 , then p ∈ sb k (r) for all k ≤ n.
Note that from the definition of P n+1 , for every h ∈ H n ∩ H(p i ) and q i ∈ P i (h), there exists an opposition h-plan
(p i ) , and so
By the induction hypothesis, 5.1 is true for all h ∈ H(p i ). And so as in the case n = 0, we deduce that p ∈ r . Moreover, for every k ≤ n and node h ∈ H k ∩ H(p i ), we have-by the induction hypothesis and by the reconstruction
And so inductively we have that p ∈ sb k (r) for every k < n. As for k = n, one has sb(sb n−1 (r)) = h∈H k b h (sb k−1 (r)).
Since sb n (r) = sb n−1 (r) ∧ sb(sb n−1 (r)), one gets p ∈ sb n (r). For every other p, the inductive construction entails p ∈ P k+1 i ⇔ p ∈ sb k (r) . So the lemma is proved.
Thus, a plan p i of player i is consistent with sb 0 (r) ∧ . . . ∧ sb n (r) iff
. By Lemma 5.1, P m is nonempty, equal to P n for all n ≥ m, and every profile in P m leads to the unique BI outcome. So, P m is consistent with sb 0 (r) ∧ . . . ∧ sb n−1 (r) for all n ≥ m, and the Main Theorem is proved.
Discussion
Battigalli and Siniscalchi
In this subsection we would like to further relate to the connection between BS model and the presented language. Basically BS uses Harsanyi type space, in which every type of every player comprises a conditional probability system over the other players' strategies and types. A natural question to ask, in this context, is whether BS type space provides a model for our axiomatization.
There is a natural way to identify each formula in our language with a corresponding event in BS type space. But it turns out that the connection between our syntax and BS universal type space is much stronger. In fact one can prove that with an additional axiom (see axiom (3.8) in the Appendix) BS type space provide a canonical model for our axiomatization.
18
That is, every tautology in our language is valid in every state of the world, when it translated to BS type space, and vice versa, every formula that is valid in every state of the world is tautology with respect to our augmented axiomatization.
19
18 See the Appendix for a precise definition of canonical model. 19 The paper does not include the formal proof of this assertion; it can be supplied by 30
General Extensive Games
Here we restrict the analysis to PI extensive-form games, but in fact it is equally valid for general finite extensive games with perfect recall. The way to adjust the framework for this case is fairly obvious. Again we use plans rather than strategies, except that now H i is the collection of information sets of i; indeed, in the PI case it is identical to the set of histories of player i.
The axiomatization stays the same but here we have a belief with a probability one modality for every player's information set rather than for every node. However, it turns out that our definition of rationality is too weak to apply to general extensive games. In particular, in order to obtain BS's or Pearce's [9] extensive form rationalizability one needs a stronger definition of rationality.
20
A Appendix
We present a class of models for our axiomatization, AX, that links the syntax to the semantics. The most preferable way would be to link the syntax to a class of models that characterize it by soundness and completeness relation. The way to do that would be by looking at the canonical model of the language with respect to the logic that our axiomatization defines.
We would first like to introduce some more terminology:
An axiom system is said to be sound for a language with respect to a class C of models if every tautology f is valid with respect to C i.e., valid in every the author upon request. 20 Again, a more detailed and formal approach for this case is beyond the scope of this paper and can be supplied by the author upon request.
31 model in C. An axiom system is said to be complete for a language with respect to a class of models C if every valid formula f with respect to C is provable in the axiom system.
Throughout we fix an extensive form PI game G.
A.1 The Canonical Model
Definition A.1. A set of formulas Γ is maximally consistent with respect to AX if it satisfies the following two conditions:
a. Γ is consistent with respect to AX.
b. Γ is maximal with respect to that property.
It can be seen that maximal sets do exist 21 and satisfy the following properties:
Definition A.2. For each Γ ∈ Ω and non-terminal node h ∈ H i , we define Γ i /h to be the set of all formulas that player i h-believes in Γ. More precisely,
For every player i and non-terminal node h ∈ H i , define the usual accessibility binary relation R Lemma A.2. For every Γ ∈ Ω and every formula f , Γ ∈ f iff f ∈ Γ.
Proof. We will prove the lemma using induction on the depth of the formula. 
35
Recall that a canonical model M = {Ω, p, (K i ) i∈I , ((B h i ) h∈H i ) i∈I } for χ with respect to AX is a model for which every AX-tautology formula is true in every ω ∈ Ω and every AX-consistent formula f is valid (i.e., true in some ω ∈ Ω). Thus Lemma A.2 leads to the following immediate corollary:
Corollary A.3. M = {Ω, p, (K i ) i∈I , ((B h i ) h∈H i ) i∈I } is a canonical model with respect to AX.
Denote the class of models for our language, was introduced in Definition In order to be able to define truth assessment in Ω for formulas in χ we have to be able to interpret formulas of the form t(f ). For Γ ∈ Ω define Γ |= t(f ) iff f = Ω.
So t(f ) is true in Ω iff f is true in each Γ ∈ Ω.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Set, T = {f ∈ χ : f = Ω}.
T obviously satisfies T ∩ χ = T. The uniquness of T follows by a simple induction over the construction of a formula in χ .
